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Clark: English Rule Against Hearsay

THE CHANGING FACE OF THE RULE AGAINST HEARSAY
IN ENGLISH LAW
by

R.A.

CLARK*

The rule against hearsay has always been surrounded by an aura of
mystery and has been treated with excessive reverence by many English
judges. Traditionally the English courts have been reluctant to allow any
development in the exceptions to this exclusionary rule, regarding hearsay
evidence as being so dangerous that even where it appears to be of a high probative calibre it should be excluded at all costs. But recent developments, both
statutory and common law, have demonstrated a much more relaxed approach
to this rule. In civil cases the hearsay rule has been contained in statutory form
for some time. The Civil Evidence Act 1968 places the emphasis on the admissibility of hearsay evidence, both oral and written, subject to certain procedural safeguards. In criminal cases, however, the rule remains the basic exclusionary common law rule together with various common law and statutory
exceptions to it. It is in relation to these exceptions that the most interesting
developments are taking place and which this article seeks to examine, in particular the proposals in the Criminal Justice Bill' in relation to documentary
hearsay and the recent House of Lords decision on the res gestae principle in R
v Andrews.I
DOCUMENTARY HEARSAY IN CRIMINAL CASES

The House of Lords decision in Myers v DPP, demonstrated graphically
how what appeared to be very cogent documentary evidence could be rendered
inadmissible by strict adherence to the hearsay rule. In this case the defendant
had been charged with various counts involving the theft of cars. His alleged
modus operandi was to buy a wrecked car and then steal a car in good condition, as nearly as possible identical to the wrecked car. He would then disguise
the stolen car as the wrecked car including the transfer of number plates,
engine number and chassis number. The stolen car was then sold together with
the log book of the wrecked car. It was not possible, however, to transfer the
block number from one car to another since this was indelibly stamped on the
engine. The prosecution wished to put in evidence microfilms of record cards
kept by workers at the Longbridge Austin Car Factory on which had been
recorded the engine number, chassis number and block number of each vehicle
as it was being assembled. If admissible these records would have been almost
*Barrister-at-Law, Principal Lecturer in Law at the Polytechnic, Wolverhampton; Visiting Professor,
School of Law, University of Akron 1987-88.
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incontrovertable evidence that the log books did not belong to the cars and
that the cars were stolen. The House of Lords held that these records were inadmissible because they had not been brought to court by a witness who had
been responsible for compiling the records and who could testify as to the accuracy of the records.
The Court of Appeal in Myers" had held that the records were admissible
on the simple grounds that the evidence did not infringe the hearsay rule
because its probative value did not depend upon the credit of an unidentified
person, but rather on the circumstances in which the records were maintained
and the inherent probability that it was correct rather than incorrect. In other
words, they placed the emphasis on probative value as the basis for the admissibility of what might otherwise be considered hearsay evidence, rather
than technical exceptions to an exclusionary rule. This was to be the approach
adopted in relation to similar fact evidence by the House of Lords in DPPv
Boardman.5 But the House of Lords rejected this approach, preferring to
uphold the established view of the hearsay rule. As Lord Reid said in his judgment: "This is a technical point, but the law regarding hearsay evidence is
technical, and I would say absurdly technical." 6 Nevertheless it was technicality that decided the case and rendered the Longbridge records inadmissible.
The consequence of the Myers case was that it was left to Parliament to
extend the exceptions to the hearsay rule in criminal cases by making admissible certain types of documentary hearsay. S.L.i. of the Criminal Evidence Act
19657 therefore provided for the admissibility of business records where direct
oral testimony of the contents of those records would have been admissible and
where the person who supplied the information contained in the record was
dead, beyond the seas, unfit, could not with reasonable diligence be traced, or
could not reasonably be expected to have any recollection of the matters dealt
with in the information he supplied. This new statutory exception to the hearsay rule could be seen as an extension of the long established common law rule
which admits the declarations of deceased persons acting under a duty to do an
act and record it in the ordinary course of business. The principal flaw in the
1965 act was that it was restricted to business records. This was highlighted in
a number of post 1965 cases, a good example of which was R v Patel.8
In Patel,the defendant was charged, inter alia, with assisting illegal entry
2119871 1 All E.R. 513.
'[19651 A.C. 1001.
'[19651 48 Crim. App. 348.

'[19751 A.C. 421.
61[19751 A.C. at 1007.
711965] C. 20.
8[19811 3 All E.R. 94.
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into the United Kingdom contrary to s.25.i.d. of the Immigration Act 1971.1
The disputed evidence consisted of Home Office records which revealed that
the alleged illegal immigrant was not a person entitled to a certificate of registration in the UK. These records had been brought to court by an immigration
officer to prove that the person Patel had helped to enter the country was an illegal immigrant. The records had not been compiled by the immigration officer
and so he was not able to testify as to the method of compilation and custody
of the records; thus the records were left to speak for themselves and were consequently inadmissible hearsay. Furthermore, these records were not of a kind
covered by the exception in s.l.i. of the Criminal Evidence Act 196510 since
they were not business records. The principle in Myers was therefore followed:
that the rule against hearsay is a strict exclusionary rule. Only when such
evidence falls within a clearly established exception to the rule can it be admitted.
As a matter of logic there can be no reason why business records should
be admitted in criminal proceedings when records kept by public bodies are
not. For this reason s. 68 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 198411
repealed the 1965 act and replaced it with a much broader statutory exception.
This section provides for the admissibility of any documentary record where
the person compiling the record was acting under a duty from information supplied by a person with personal knowledge of the matters dealt with, subject to
the condition that the supplier of information is dead, unfit, beyond the seas, it
is not reasonably practicable to secure his attendance at court, or he cannot
reasonably be expected to have any recollection of the matters dealt with in
that information. This exception is therefore wide enough to cover the facts in
both Myers and Patel so that both lots of records would now be admissible.
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE BILL 1'

It seems that the life of s.68 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 3 is
going to be a short one. Clause 14 and clause 15 of the Criminal Justice Bill,
currently on its way through Parliament provide for a much wider statutory
exception to the hearsay rule in respect of documents. Clause 14 provides as
follows: A statement made by a person in a document shall be admissible in
criminal proceedings as evidence of any fact of which direct oral evidence by
him would be admissible.

4

The effect of this provision will be to make admissible all first hand
911971) C. 77.
0
119651 C. 20.
"[19841 C. 60.
1211986] Bill 44 [the enactment of this bill has been delayed by the 1987 general election].

13119841 C. 60.
1[1986] Bill 44.
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documentary evidence whatever its nature, subject to a discretion to exclude
contained in clause 16. This is, therefore, a very far reaching provision going
well beyond any previous statutory exceptions. The emphasis is placed on admissibility rather than inadmissibility, and there are no restrictions on the
types of documents covered: they need not be business records or documents
compiled by someone acting under a duty and there are no pre-conditions that
the declarant be dead, unavailable, unfit, beyond the seas or unable to
remember the facts recorded in the document.
Clause 15 deals with 'business' documents, rendering admissible
statements in documents compiled in the course of any trade, business, profession or other occupation, or by a person as the holder of any paid or unpaid office." This provision will be wide enough to cover situations like Myers and
Patel, but also documents from a wide range of other sources, including
documents kept by officers of purely private organizations, such as clubs and
societies, etc. The clause is not restricted to records nor is there any precondition that the recorder be acting under a duty, although the supplier of the information contained in the document must have had or be reasonably expected to have had personal knowledge of those facts. There are no preconditions concerning the availability of the declarant. Many documents will be admissible by virtue of both clauses but documents admissible under clause 15 include those containing multiple hearsay, whereas clause 14 only applies to first
hand hearsay.
Both clause 14 and clause 15 are made subject to a judicial discretion to
exclude contained in clause 16 of the bill. This discretion is broadly expressed
and must be exercised "in the interests of justice." Factors which the judge or
magistrate may take into account in exercising this discretion include the
nature and source of the document, the likelihood that it is authentic, whether
or not the evidence contained in the document is available by other means, the
relevance of the evidence and the possibility of controverting the statement.
These factors specified in clause 16.ii. are without prejudice to the generality of
the discretion.
Clause 17 provides that statements in documents made for the purposes of
pending or contemplated litigation or criminal investigation may only be admitted with the leave of the court. This is presumably intended to prevent the
prosecution from basing the whole of their case on police statements without
having to call the makers of those statements as witnesses. However, if the bill
passes into law in its current form it will be theoretically possible, though
highly unlikely, for this to happen.
The total effect of this bill is to place the emphasis on admissibility of
documents in criminal cases. It will be interesting to see how the judiciary aphttp://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol21/iss1/4
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proach the use of the discretion. If they take a liberal approach it may well be
that documentary evidence will sometimes constitute the bulk of prosecution
evidence and oral testimony will become the exception rather than the rule.
This would have major consequences for the defense and the art of the defense
lawyer. In view of the fact that in most criminal cases the object of the defense
lawyer is to discredit the prosecution case by skillful cross examination of prosecution witnesses, very different skills will be required if there are no
witnesses to cross examine. If, on the other hand, the judges are restrictive in
the exercise of this discretion, as they have tended to be in their approach to
hearsay evidence, then the introduction of this new approach to documentary
hearsay evidence may not turn out to be particularly radical in effect.
THE HOUSE OF LORDS DECISION IN R VANDREWS&

This important decision on the res gestae principle seems to show a more
liberal approach by the courts to the admissibility of hearsay evidence and
might therefore be indicative of the way the discretion in the Criminal Justice
Bill will be applied. In Andrews, a man was attacked in his flat when he
answered the door to two men. He was discovered by a neighbor who summoned the police. When the police arrived a short time later, the victim was
able to identify one of his attackers. He died two months later. His statement
was not a dying declaration and could only be admitted if it formed part of the
res gestae. The defense argued that the statement was not sufficiently contemporaneous with the attack to form part of the res gestae, relying heavily on the
case of R v Bedingfield. 17 The House of Lords however chose to restate the
principles laid down by Lord Wiberforce in the Privy Council decision in Ratten v The Queen, 11 in which he placed the emphasis on the possibility of concoction or distortion as the basis for the admissibility/inadmissibility of res
gestae statements. The question of contemporaniety should be determined on
the basis of whether the facts of the case were the dominant factor in the
declarant's mind at the time the statement was made. In other words, the emphasis is on the strength of the evidence rather than strict adherence to
technical rules. This can be seen as a very different approach from that of Lord
Reid in Myers v DPP,9 referred to at the beginning of this article. It has been
suggested by some writers 0 that the approach in Ratten should be adopted as
the test for admissibility of hearsay evidence generally, so that strong, probative hearsay evidence, both oral and written, would be admissible [the
possibility of concoction or distortion being the test] whereas weak hearsay of

little probative value would be excluded. It will be interesting to see, therefore,
16[19871 1 All E.R. 513.

1[71879114 Cox C.C. 341.
"119711 3 All E.R. 81.
"See ante p. 1.
ON EVIDENCE, 405 (1981).
CASES& MATERIALS1988
"E.g. CARTER:
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if this broad approach is adopted in relation to the discretion to exclude
documentary hearsay in the new bill.
SUMMARY

There is no doubt that the last twenty years has seen a gradual erosion of
the rule against hearsay in English criminal law. This has been as a result of
statutory intervention, the courts having adhered to a predominantly restrictive and technical approach to the hearsay rule. The combined effect of a new
Criminal Justice Act including radical provisions on documentary hearsay and
a broader less technical approach to oral hearsay by the courts as suggested in
Andrews may well herald the end of the hearsay rule as we know it, bringing
English law into line with most other systems, where the nature and source of
an item of evidence is significant only as regards weight and does not affect its
admissibility. This would also mirror the approach English law takes to that
other major exclusionary rule of evidence, the similar fact evidence rule in
Boardman. If, however, the common law had adopted the approach of the
Court of Appeal in Myers, it might well have been the case that this piecemeal
statutory reform would not have been necessary and the courts would have
been able to control their own destiny on the admissibility of hearsay evidence.
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